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Tel brille au second rang, qui s’eclipse au premier.1
(Voltaire: Henriet)
Abstract
The 2018-19 UEFA Nations League is the inaugural season of this competition,
which provides the basis of the seeding for the 55 men’s national football teams
participating in the qualification process of the UEFA European Championship 2020.
In addition, unlike previous editions, the teams for the play-offs are also selected with
the consideration of their performance in the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League. Thus
16 teams, which failed to qualify through their group, are divided into four paths of
four teams each according to a complicated rule because the places vacated by the
20 directly qualified teams should be filled. We provide a critical examination of the
relevant UEFA regulations and show that the articles may contradict to each other
and may lead to an unfair formulation of play-off paths. Straightforward solutions
for both problems are suggested.
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1 Introduction
Qualification for the 2020 UEFA European Championship, commonly known as UEFA Euro,
gives men’s national football teams a secondary route through play-offs to compete in the final
* E-mail: laszlo.csato@uni-corvinus.hu
1 “He shines in the second rank, who is eclipsed in the first.” Source: https://quotes.
yourdictionary.com/author/quote/539979. Downloaded 26 March 2019.
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tournament. Unlike previous editions, the participants of the play-offs will not be decided from
the results in the qualifying group stage but on the basis of the inaugural season of the UEFA
Nations League. This means that the current regulation (UEFA, 2018a) was never used in
practice, hence it may probably contain more imperfections than usual. This note will reveal
two potential problems.
In our opinion, analysis of sports rules from a theoretical perspective is an important duty of
academic research. Szymanski (2003) argues that tournament design is a matter of significant
financial concern for the parties, and a matter of personal interest for millions of fans. Furthermore,
sports are of great interest to a high percentage of the world’s population, so there is little that
could be researched into that is more important (Wright, 2014). It is also known that sports
rules may lead to unforeseen and/or unwanted consequences: Kendall and Lenten (2017) offers
the first comprehensive review on this issue in the scientific literature.
The number of papers investigating similar questions has significantly increased in recent
years. Pauly (2014) develops a mathematical model of strategic manipulation in complex sports
competition formats such as the FIFA World Cup. Vong (2017) proves that the necessary and
sufficient condition of incentive compatibility in multistage tournaments is to allow only the
top-ranked player to qualify from each group. Arlegi and Dimitrov (2018) introduce two basic
principles of fairness and apply these requirements to a class of sports competitions. Guyon
(2018b) quantifies how often the suspicion of match fixing is expected to happen in groups of
three with the top two teams advancing (the suggested format of the 2026 FIFA World Cup) and
explain how to build the match schedule in order to minimise the risk of collusion. Csato´ (2019b)
shows that tournament systems consisting of round-robin groups in the preliminary and main
rounds – widely used in handball and other sports (Csato´, 2019c) – are incentive incompatible
when the results of the games played against teams qualified for the same main round group are
carried over from the preliminary round.
A whole segment of literature deals with the fairness of penalty shootouts (Anbarcı et al.,
2015, 2018; Brams and Ismail, 2018; Csato´, 2019a; Echenique, 2017; Palacios-Huerta, 2012;
Vandebroek et al., 2018) as the existing system (IFAB, 2018) seems to give an unfair advantage
to the team kicking the first penalty (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Palacios-Huerta,
2014).
Some topics are particularly relevant for the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA).
According to Dagaev and Sonin (2018), qualification for the UEFA Europa League was incentive
incompatible until the 2015-16 season, in other words, a team might have benefited from losing
instead of winning. Csato´ (2019e) shows that this problem emerged in practice in the 2011-12
season of the Eredivisie, the highest echelon of professional football in the Netherlands. Because
of the same reason, qualification for the UEFA Champions League did not satisfy incentive
compatibility in three seasons (Csato´, 2019d). Qualification for some recent FIFA World Cups
(Csato´, 2017) and UEFA European Championships (Csato´, 2018c) also allowed for such a
manipulation, which can be eliminated by a marginal amendment of the rules (Csato´, 2018a).
Furthermore, it is even possible that the two teams playing a match are both interested in a
draw (Csato´, 2018b). Finally, Guyon (2018a) identifies several flaws in the design of the knockout
bracket of UEFA Euro 2016 and suggests two fairer procedures.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the tournament to be analysed and
discusses the relevant regulation. Two problems are identified in Section 3. Section 4 proposes a
solution to these issues, while Section 5 concludes.
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2 The play-offs of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying
tournament
The UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying tournament is a football competition played from March 2019 to
March 2020 in order to select the 24 men’s national teams from the 55 UEFA members that will
participate in the UEFA European Championship 2020 final tournament. In the main qualifying
tournament, organised between March 2019 and November 2019, teams are allocated into 10
groups, five of five teams each and five of six teams each such that the top two teams from each
group qualify. The teams are seeded on the basis of another competition, the 2018-19 edition of
the UEFA Nations League with some restrictions (UEFA, 2018b).
The last four teams are determined by the play-offs of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying
tournament. Unlike previous editions of the UEFA European Championship, teams do not
qualify for the play-offs from the qualifying group stage, but the 16 teams are selected on the
basis of their performance in the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League according to the following rules:
“Sixteen teams enter the play-offs, which are played in four separate paths of four teams each,
to determine the remaining four teams that qualify for the final tournament (UEFA, 2018a,
Article 16.01).
To determine the 16 teams that enter the play-offs, the following principles apply in the order
given:
a. Four play-off slots are allocated to each league from UEFA Nations League D to UEFA
Nations League A, i.e. in reverse alphabetical order.
b. The UEFA Nations League group winners enter the play-offs unless they have qualified
for the final tournament directly from the qualifying group stage.
c. If a UEFA Nations League group winner has directly qualified for the final tournament,
the next best-ranked team in the relevant league ranking which has not directly qualified
will enter the play-offs.
d. If fewer than four teams from one league enter the play-offs, the remaining slots are
allocated on the basis of the overall UEFA Nations League rankings to the best-ranked
of the teams that have not already qualified for the final tournament, subject to the
restriction that group winners cannot be in a play-off path with higher-ranked teams
(UEFA, 2018a, Article 16.02).
The UEFA administration conducts a draw to allocate teams to the different play-offs path,
starting with UEFA Nations League D, subject to the following conditions:
a. A group winner cannot form a path with a team from a higher-ranked league in the
overall UEFA Nations League rankings.
b. If four or more teams from a league enter the play-offs, a path with four teams from the
league in question must be formed.
c. Additional conditions may be applied, subject to approval by the UEFA Executive
Committee, including seeding principles and the possibility of final tournament host
associations having to be drawn into different paths (UEFA, 2018a, Article 16.03).”
For the sake of simplicity, UEFA (2018a, Article 16.02) will be called the team selection rule,
while UEFA (2018a, Article 16.03) will be called the path formation rule in the following.
The overall UEFA Nations League ranking ranks the 55 UEFA members from 1 to 55 such
that (12) teams 1-12 are from League A, (12) teams 13-24 are from League B, (15) teams 25-39
are from League C, and (16) teams 40-55 are from League D. In addition, (four) teams 1-4 are
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the group winners of League A, (four) teams 13-16 are the group winners of League B, (four)
teams 25-28 are the group winners of League C, and (four) teams 40-43 are the group winners of
League D. All teams will be denoted by these numbers.
3 Problems with the regulation
We formulate here two requirements for the play-offs of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying tournament
and show that they are not guaranteed by the regulation (UEFA, 2018a, Article 16).
3.1 Consistency
The first condition deals with the logical connections between the rules.
Definition 3.1. A team selection rule is consistent if its principles do not contradict to each
other. Otherwise, it is said to be inconsistent.
Inconsistency means a problem because a possible scenario not addressed by the rules can
result in long controversies such as in the case of the qualification of the titleholder Liverpool
F.C. for the 2005-06 UEFA Champions League. Unfortunately, UEFA (2018a, Article 16.02)
can lead to an impossibility of the team selection problem, i.e. it might happen with a positive
probability that 16 teams cannot be selected for the play-offs respecting all conditions.
Proposition 3.1. The team selection rule of UEFA (2018a, Article 16.02) is inconsistent.
Proof. It is enough to provide an example when the principles are contradictory.
Assume that the last 13 teams of the overall UEFA Nations League ranking, that is, teams
43-55 qualify for the UEFA Euro 2020 through the main qualifying tournament. It is possible
because teams 43-55 are drawn from Pots 5 and 6, consequently, no group contains more than
two teams from these 13 teams.
Teams 40-42 are group winners in League D, therefore they enter the play-offs. However,
there exists no other team in League D that failed to qualify directly, hence these three group
winners should be in a play-off path with higher-ranked teams.
3.2 Fairness
The second condition concerns the strength of different play-off paths.
Definition 3.2. Play-off path 𝑃𝑖 is stronger than play-off path 𝑃𝑗 if there exists a mapping
from the four teams in 𝑃𝑖 to the four teams in 𝑃𝑗 such that each team in 𝑃𝑖 is ranked higher
than its pair in 𝑃𝑗 .
Obviously, this order is not complete, namely, it might happen that play-off path 𝑃𝑖 is not
stronger than play-off path 𝑃𝑗 , and 𝑃𝑗 is not stronger than 𝑃𝑖.
The following example illustrates Definition 3.2.
Example 3.1. Consider the play-off paths 𝑃𝑖 = {13, 18, 19, 20} and 𝑃𝑗 = {17, 29, 30, 31} where
the numbers denote the teams. Then play-off path 𝑃𝑖 is stronger than play-off path 𝑃𝑗 according
to the mapping 13→ 17, 18→ 29, 19→ 30, 20→ 31.
Definition 3.3. A path formation rule is unfair if a group winner may be in a stronger play-off
path than a lower-ranked team of the same league.
The motivation of our fairness requirement comes from the idea behind UEFA (2018a,
Article 16): the group winners of the UEFA Nations League are preferred in the play-offs.
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Proposition 3.2. The path formation rule of UEFA (2018a, Article 16.03) may be unfair.
Proof. It is enough two show an example where the principles do not guarantee fairness.
Assume that all (12) teams 1-12 from League A, (six) teams 14-16, 18-19, 22 from League
B, and (two) teams 26, 31 from League C qualify for the UEFA Euro 2020 through the main
qualifying tournament. It is possible because (10) teams 1-10 are from Pot 1, (seven) teams
11-12, 14-16, 18-19 are from Pot 2, (two) teams 22, 26 are from Pot 3, and (one) team 31 is from
Pot 4, thus no group may contain more than two teams from this set.
(Four) teams 40-43 are group winners in League D, so they enter play-off path D. (Three)
teams 25, 27-28 are group winners in League C, which failed to qualify, so they enter play-off
path C. Team 29 also enter the play-offs. Team 13 is a group winner in League B, which failed to
qualify, so it enters the play-offs. (Five) teams 17, 20-21, 23-24 from League B, and (two) teams
30, 32 from League C enter the play-offs, too.
It is guaranteed by UEFA (2018a, Article 16.03) that one of (three) teams 29-30, 32 is in
play-off path C because a group winner cannot form a path with a team from a higher-ranked
league in the overall UEFA Nations League rankings. However, team 13 may form play-off path
B together with (three) teams 20, 21, 24, while teams 17, 22 together with two of (three) teams
29-30, 32 may form play-off path A. Then play-off path B is stronger than play-off path A due
to the mapping 13 → 17, 20 → 22, 21 → 29/30/31, 24 → 29/30/31, implying that team 13, a
group winner in League B, faces stronger opponents in the play-offs than a second-placed team
(possibly from the same group) 17 in League B.
The situation outlined in the proof of Proposition 3.2 was “officially presented” in UEFA
(2017, European Qualifiers Play-offs Scenario 1) without the observation of its unfairness.
4 Suggested solutions
This section provides our amendments in order to solve the issues discussed in Section 3.
4.1 Guaranteeing consistency
The inconsistency of the team selection rule can be handled in a straightforward way by
supplementing UEFA (2018a, Article 16.02d) with a specific clause:
“If fewer than four teams from one league enter the play-offs, the remaining slots are allocated
on the basis of the overall UEFA Nations League rankings to the best-ranked of the teams that
have not already qualified for the final tournament, subject to the restriction that group winners
cannot be in a play-off path with higher-ranked teams, or, if it is not possible, they are in
a play-off path with the lowest-ranked teams available for the play-off.”
4.2 Guaranteeing fairness
Note that a group winner will not be in a stronger play-off path than a lower-ranked team from
its league unless more than four teams from this league compete in the play-offs. Our proposal
is to favour the highest-ranked group winner in such a case by placing it into a path with the
lowest-ranked team available for this purpose without the violation of the principles described in
UEFA (2018a, Article 16.03). Thus UEFA (2018a, Article 16.03) is worth supplementing with a
new requirement, practically between the conditions b and c:
“If more than four teams from a league, including at least one group winner, enter
the play-offs, the highest-ranked team in this league entering the play-offs forms a
path with the lowest-ranked team entering the play-offs from a league from which
not exactly four teams enter the play-offs and is not a group winner there.”
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5 Conclusions
In this note, we have investigated the regulation of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying play-offs,
and identified two shortcomings of it. While these issues may occur with a low probability, the
integrity of sports rules require all possible scenarios to be considered in a fair way. Our reasoning
will hopefully convince UEFA that the proposed amendments are worth implementing.
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